The Brest Fortress

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spring 1941. nazi germany dominates europe.poland and france have been occupied. only the british commonwealth fights on. hitler now turns east to the soviet union, where nazi dreams of a new land empireare to be fulfilled. episode 1 - barbarossa april 1941. in a field in western ukraine,a satisfied soviet pilot counted bullet holesin the aircraft he’d just shot down. the twin-engined german aircrafthad civilian markings. but the military bearingof the pilots was obvious.

the smell of burning plastic wasfurther cause for suspicion. it came from a smoulderingpile of photographic film, which the germanshad hurriedly tried to destroy. in the spring of 1941 nazi germanyand the soviet union were allies. but everyone knew it could not last. german reconnaissance aircraft,flying 33,000 feet above the soviet union, usually passed unnoticed.but on 15th april 1941, engine trouble forcedone junkers 86 to lose altitude. it was quickly intercepted and shot down.

under interrogation, the junkers pilotssaid they’d lost their way flying to krakow in german-occupied poland.it wasn’t very convincing. they’d been shot down near rovno,more than 200 miles from krakow — deep inside the soviet union. the pilots were from the elite ‘rowel’high-altitude reconnaissance squadron. they had been secretly photographingsoviet territory for months, in preparation for the germaninvasion of the soviet union. ten days later, a top-secret report arrivedin moscow from major general tupikov, the soviet military attach㩠in berlin.

his report made two conclusions.“number one — the germans are planning warwith the soviet union. number two — they plan to attack soon —definitely before the end of the year.” in the spring of 1941,neither tupikov nor other soviet agents could say exactly whenthe german invasion would come. stalin’s best spy, richard sorge, had claimed that the invasionwould begin around march, after the harvest was sown.then, he said the end of may. when that passed,he said the second half of june.

the reports from soviet agentswere confused and contradictory. in short, no one in moscow was certainif or when the germans would invade. in later years it was rumoured that thegerman invasion plans were on stalin’s desk almost as soon as they were signed.but in reality, no such plans were stolen. masses of information was receivedfrom the soviet intelligence network. but only a few reportsreceived proper analysis. many valuable ones got lostin the soviet bureaucracy. 5 months earlier, in december 1940,hitler had issued fuehrer directive 21. it ordered german forces to prepare for the invasion of the soviet union –

codename: operation barbarossa. now, german troopswere streaming eastwards, taking up positionalong the soviet frontier. hitler would later claim that the red armyhad been massed along the border, poised to invade germany.thus he claimed operation barbarossa was a pre-emptive strike —a legitimate act of self-defence. but this was classic nazi propaganda.hitler wanted others, particularly in the neutral countries,to believe his invasion was justified. but few were fooled.

in private, hitler was more candidabout his reasons for invading the ussr. “it is only the possibility of russiaentering the war”, he said, “that now gives the english hope.if that hope is ruined, the english would have to make peace.” operation barbarossa wasan ambitious invasion plan, relying on the blitzkrieg tactics thathad proved so effective against the french and british the previous year. the attack was to be spearheadedby 4 panzer groups. their tank and motorised infantry divisionswould seek to make rapid advances deep

into enemy territory,leading to the encirclement and destruction of enemy armieson the frontier. the four panzer groupswere commanded by generals von kleist… hoepner… guderian… and hoth. the ultimate goal was the capture of moscow,and the whole of european russia. german strategists believedthat their military superiority would lead to victory in 3 to 4 months. for the invasion, german forceswere divided into three formations. army group north was to advancetowards leningrad…

army group centre towards moscow… and army group south towards kievand the donets basin. army groups northand south each had one panzer group. army group centre had two, includingthird panzer group commanded by hoth. colonel-general herman hothhad distinguished himself in the campaigns against poland and france. he was 56 years old,and referred to affectionately by his soldiers as “papa” hoth. unlike russia, where many senior officershad been killed in political purges,

germany could call ona wealth of experienced commanders. most soviet generals were in their 40s.in contrast, guderian was 53... hoepner 55... and von kleist 60. panzer group command staffs arrived at thesoviet frontier during the winter of 1940. at first only staff officersand signals troops were sent. the tanks were not to arriveuntil the very eve of the attack. by keeping his tanks in the west, hitler wanted it to look likehe still planned to invade britain, and prepared only defensiveoperations in the east.

and so an invasion army quietlyassembled on russia’s doorstep. in 1941, the wehrmacht wasat the height of its power. its divisions had beenbrought to full strength. morale was high after victory in the west. the last few months had been spentin intensive training for blitzkrieg operations. in contrast, the red army was dispersedacross the soviet union, with many of its units stillat peacetime strength. the forces at the border spent much oftheir time listening to political lectures.

it would take two or three weeks ofredeployment to properly reinforce them. and there was little preparationfor defence — after all, the red army always expected to attack. furthermore, stalin was in no rushto fight a war against nazi germany. he knew the soviet union was not ready. in 1939 nazi germany andthe soviet union had signed an alliance. but stalin harboured no illusions. intensive military constructionwas under way in the ussr. the red army had grown from strengthof one and a half million troops,

to five million.in the summer of 1941, soviet armed forces were still in the midstof reorganisation and expansion. fortifications were still being built,airfields overhauled, and new units formed. until these preparations were complete, stalin was desperate to stave offany conflict with hitler’s germany. but the reports from soviet intelligencewere becoming more ominous. in early june 1941,the germans started moving armoured and motorized divisionstowards the frontier. this no longer looked like preparationsfor a defensive operation.

8 days before the invasion,the soviet state news agency, tass, printed a report in one of its newspapers. it read, “in the britishand foreign press in general, there are rumours circulatingabout an imminent war between the soviet union and germany. soviet official circles believe that these rumours are absolutely groundless.” it was an invitation from stalin to hitler to settle their differencesthrough negotiation. but in reply,there came only deathly silence.

stalin finally ordered reinforcementssent to the frontier. even now,three days after the tass message, soviet spy richard sorge reported: “the invasion has been delayeduntil the end of june.” stalin hoped once morethat war could be put off. but it was too late: the invasion was now less than one week away. on 22nd june the red armywas formed in three echelons, stretching from polandto the dnieper river. most soviet troops were only just beginningto move west to face the nazi threat.

in contrast german forces were massedon the frontier, ready to strike. at the start of the invasion, in the baltic republics 21 soviet divisionswould face 34 german divisions. in byelorussia, 26 red army divisionsfaced 36 german divisions. in ukraine 45 soviet divisionswould meet 57 wehrmacht divisions. the red army was outnumbered, and although it had more tanks and aircraft, they would prove to be of little value. on 21st june, german high commandtransmitted the signal “dortmund”. it confirmed operation barbarossafor the next morning.

tanks, armoured vehicles and trucksmoved to jumping-off positions. that evening, german officerssummoned their men, to read them a proclamationfrom adolf hitler to his troops. it declared, “the fate of the germanreich is now in your hands.” in the days to come, german soldierswere to be guided by directives such as those from general hoepner: “your struggle must pursue the objectiveof turning today’s russia into ruins, and must be carried outwith extreme severity.” but not all soldiers wanted to be part ofthis so-called “crusade for civilization”.

sapper alfred liskow, a secret communist,made for the border. he crossed the bug river,and surrendered to soviet border guards. stammering with excitement,he told them that at dawn the next day, the nazis would attack. before the sapper was dry his wordswere on their way to stalin. similar information came from a soviet agent in the german embassy, gerhard kegel. on the morning of 21st june he reportedthat the war would begin within 48 hours. in the kremlin, general zhukov,marshal timoshenko and general vatutin managed to persuade stalinthat action was needed.

a directive placed all troopsin a state of readiness, but with a warning that the germansmay be trying to provoke them. the orders reached front line units justafter one o’clock in the morning. in minsk, general pavlov, commanderof the byelorussian military district, arrived at his headquartersin the middle of the night. waiting for him was a report from the town of grodno near the frontier. it read, “ammunition has been distributed.we’re taking up defensive positions. commander of the 3rd army,vasiliy kuznetsov.” vasiliy ivanovich kuznetsov had beenconscripted to fight in the first world war.

he later rose to commanda rifle regiment in the russian civil war. when the second world war began,he was 47 years old, and would endure its hardshipsfrom the first day, to the very last. the warnings about an invasiondidn’t surprise kuznetsov. his troops had been listeningto the roar of engines from across the border for many hours.it could mean only one thing. the first germans to cross the borderwere from the brandenburg regiment, an elite german special forces unit. with a mixture of trickery,stealth and surprise,

the german commandos secured keybridges across the bug river. the luftwaffe was already airborne. they were heading for majorsoviet cities in the west, and airfields identifiedby german air reconnaissance. the soviet air force,its aircraft parked in neat rows, had no idea of what was about to hit it.as german pilots made their final approach, they were the first to seethe sun rise on that fateful day. at 4am their bomb doors opened…and destruction rained from the sky. russia's great patriotic war had begun.

dawn on the 22nd june 1941.soviet airfields were under attack. one squadron commander,captain berkal, was quick to act, ringing the alarm and getting his meninto the air as fast as possible. where soviet fighters did manageto get airborne, they found the unmanoeuvrablegerman dive bombers were easy prey. mlynuv airfield in ukraine becamea graveyard for german bombers. here the german edelweisssquadron lost 7 aircraft. but these were token victories in adisastrous day for the red army air force. some airfields survivedthe first german strikes.

but then the luftwaffehit them again, and again. in the course of fiveor six german air raids, most soviet air bases in the westhad been put out of action. in the air, although the sovietshad many good combat aircraft, their pilots lacked the combat experienceof the messerschmitt fighter-pilots. major general kopets,air commander of the western front, made an aerial inspectionof the damage to his airfields. after landing, he shot himself. by the end of the first day,the soviet air force had lost 700 aircraft

in byelorussia, half its strength. in ukraine, 300 planes were lost —one sixth. and in the baltic, abouta hundred planes, or one tenth. the first german onslaughtwas overwhelming. the red army air force had been decimated. it would be many months before it was ableto play its part effectively in the war. german ground troops begantheir advance at 4.15 am. hoth’s tanks advanced between50 and 70 km on the baltic front, capturing key bridgesat alytus and merkine.

hoth wrote: “all three bridges acrossthe niemen river were captured intact. this was completely unexpected.” german generals quickly beganto dream of the great prize. hoth recalled: “everyone longed to geton the road to moscow as soon as possible.” for the moment, hoth’s panzer groupattacked in the direction of vilnius. the aim was to envelope soviet armiesin byelorussia from the north. but not everything went according to planfor the germans on the first day. at one pointon the frontier in byelorussia, events took an unexpectedturn for both sides —

at the 19th centuryrussian fortress of brest. the fortress was supposed to havea garrison of just one battalion. but units from two soviet divisions,totalling about 7,000 soldiers, were stationed herewhen the invasion began. on the morning of 22nd june the fortress cameunder sustained air and artillery attack. many soldiers took shelterwithin its walls, where they became trappedby the bombardment. the germans had expectedthe fort to be taken in just a few hours. but instead a bloody siegebegan which was to last several days.

the fortress garrison defendedevery inch of ground, fighting on in small isolated groups —some of them refusing to surrender. after four days the germans hadcaptured the outlying fortifications. the red army garrisonretreated to the citadel. 400 survivors, led by major gavrilov,fought off 7 or 8 attacks a day. on 29th june the germans begana two-day assault on the fortress, and finally captured the citadel. by now the defenders were running out of food and water. but still they fought on. it was a full month after the invasion

when the germans finallycaptured major gavrilov. the doctor who treated him recalled thathe was almost unconscious with exhaustion, without even the strength left to swallow. but an hour before,gavrilov had been fighting furiously, throwing grenades that killedand wounded several germans. despite the heroic resistanceof major gavrilov and his men, it was simple enoughfor guderian’s panzer group to bypass the brest fortressand cross the bug river. one advantage held by the red army seemedto lie in their huge number of tanks.

they had about 10 thousand tanksin the western military districts. but for red army light tankslike the t-26 and bt-7, it was to be a very short,and very bloody war. the t-26’s front armourwas just 15 millimetres thick. the bt-7’s was not much betterat just 22 millimetres. both were extremelyvulnerable to german guns. what’s more, their 45 millimetreguns weren’t powerful enough to pierce the armour of modern germantanks except at point-blank range. the poor design of soviet shells

meant many simply shattered on contactwith german armour. for the red army, the first tankbattles were a terrible shock. on the second day of the war, red army tanks met a german panzerdivision near pruzhany. (proo-shan-nye) the battle turned into a massacre. more than a hundred t-26 tanks weredestroyed in just a few hours of combat. on the third day of the war,in a battle near voynitsa, about 150 t-26 tanks were destroyed. the next day, soviet t-26 tankscounterattacked near the town of poå¡ilã©,

in the baltic. (porshh-ee-lay) at the start of the day the soviet 28thtank division had 130 tanks. by its end, just 50 remained. the pride of the red army lay wrecked andsmoking across the german invasion route. the german army had 4,000 tanks and self propelled guns for the invasion of russia. half of them were the virtuallyobsolete panzer i and ii light tanks. only 1,400 of them were the newpanzer 3 and panzer 4 tanks. each german panzer division had 200 tanks and more than 2,000 commandand support vehicles.

a soviet tank division had almost twiceas many tanks, but fewer support vehicles. events would provethat the germans had got it right. without enough support vehiclesto keep them supplied with fuel, ammunition and spare parts,hundreds of soviet tanks would be abandoneden route to the battlefield. german tank crews went into combatconvinced of their own superiority. but a nasty surprise lay in store. german tanker gustav schrodek of the 11thpanzer division was in action near radekhov. he recalled: “we sent the first shellinto them. it struck the turret.

the second shot was another hit.but the lead enemy tank kept advancing. what was going on?! we had always jokedthat all we had to do was “spit” at a russian tank, and it would blow up!” other reports began to arrive ofa new model of soviet tank that seemed to be immune to german guns. near raseiniai, these new soviet heavytanks shrugged off multiple hits, before bursting into the german positionand crushing guns, trucks and vehicles. the only effective way to stopthese monsters was with the powerful 88mmantiaircraft guns.

the new soviet tankswere called t-34 and kv-1. they were names german soldierswould come to dread. as fighting raged along the frontier,kuznetsov’s 3rd army near grodno was the only onethat managed to bring artillery to bear on the advancing german troops. kusnetsov’s troops foughtthe german 9th army to a standstill. german general ott wrote:“stubborn resistance by the russians has forced us to fightby the rule-book once more. we could afford to take certain chancesin poland and in the west, but not now.”

kuznetsov was alsothe first soviet commander to launch an armoured counter-attack. the soviet 6th mechanized corpshad almost 1,000 tanks, including 350 of the new t-34s and kv-1s. the decision on where to counter-attackhad to be made very quickly. when a concentration of germantanks was reported near grodno, where kuznetsov’s third army was fighting, general pavlov decidedthat that was the place to strike. it was a catastrophe. the 6th mechanizedcorps was virtually wiped out.

most tanks ran out of fuel or broke down, because supply depots had beendestroyed by air attack. when the remaining tankswere encircled by the germans, the crews blew up theirvehicles and retreated. it also became clear that there wasonly german infantry near grodno. so while the 6th mechanized corpsmade its doomed counterattack, hoth’s panzers advancedunhindered on vilnius. german control of the air meantsoviet commanders in byelorussia had no access to air reconnaissance.so largely working in the dark,

pavlov estimated that he faced onlyone or two german tank divisions. but on the third day of the war, a german reconnaissance unitwas ambushed near slonim. after the battlea german staff officer’s map was found and sentto pavlov’s headquarters. after one glance at the map,pavlov realised his terrible mistake. instead of one or two tank divisions, thewhole of guderian’s second panzer group — five panzer divisionsand 2 motorised infantry divisions, was advancing on minsk and bobruisk.

all of pavlov’s forces wereabout to be encircled. pavlov immediately ordered all his troopsto retreat eastwards, but it was too late. guderian’s panzers burst into slonim, blocking the only good roadfrom biaå‚ystok back to minsk. in byelorussia’s landscapeof marshland and dense forest, controlling a single road likethis could be decisive. other lines of retreat simply didn’t exist. german panzer groupsseemed to be advancing at will. their commanders tried to find weak pointsin the enemy line, and burst through them,

moving fast and threateningthe enemy with encirclement. to maintain momentum they simplybypassed areas of stubborn resistance. these were dealt with by infantry divisionsthat followed in their wake. armoured carsand motorised infantry in trucks and motorcycles accompaniedthe panzer columns. reconnaissance units led the way,and were the first to engage the enemy. finally, close co-operation with luftwaffeground attack aircraft made this, in 1941, an unparalleled offensive force. guderian and hoth, commanding2nd and 3rd panzer groups,

were advancing on moscow.but now they received new orders — minsk was the new priority.both generals were outraged, they saw moscow as the grand prize. but both reluctantly divertedtheir tanks towards minsk, to help complete the encirclementof pavlov’s doomed army. minsk had been bombed sincethe first day of the war. from its ruins, huge columns of blacksmoke rose, obscuring the sun. now hoth's tanks wereapproaching to seal its fate. first they would have to fight their waythrough a line of soviet fortifications.

but when one of hoth’s divisionsbroke through the line, it was immediately counterattackedand its forward units cut off. hoth’s panzer group, as he later described, had to “break though soviet fortifiedpositions situated on the highway, amidst heavy fighting”. but the tried-and-tested tacticsof the wehrmacht now proved their worth. a german tank platoon normallydeployed in a v-formation, with its two prongs facing the enemy. this allowed germantanks to attack on a narrow front —

50 or 60 tanks across 1000 metres. in 1941, a soviet division’s ordersstated that anti-tank guns should be spread evenly along the front. this meant 50 german tanks wouldonly face between 5 and 10 anti-tank guns. the german tanks overwhelmedthese guns by weight of numbers, then turned right and left to attackthe rest of the line from the side and rear. what made the situation even worse forsoviet troops was their inadequate weaponry. their staple 45 millimetre antitankgun could only penetrate the front armour of german tanks at very close range.

using superior tactics and weaponry, the germans broke throughthe red army defences around minsk after two days of fighting. as german trooped entered the city,dmitry pavlov, commander of the soviet western front, couldonly watch helplessly as the trap closed. like british and frenchgenerals before him, pavlov, had been overwhelmed by the speedand fury of the german blitzkrieg. but he did getone important decision right. as soon as he sawthe german plans for encirclement,

he ordered a retreat to the eastas fast as possible. it gave many soldiersa fighting chance of escape. it was with that hope that his mennow fell back towards minsk. but for most, there was to be no salvation. one week after the germaninvasion of the soviet union, more than 300,000 soviet soldierswere encircled around bialystok and minsk. some red army units were able to fighttheir way out of the pocket through lightly-held germanpositions to the southeast. others, including the remnantsof kuznetsov’s 3rd army,

tried to make their way back to sovietlines through the swamps and forests. the rapid german advance meantred army lines were now far to the east. most would spend weeks walking through theforests before they reached their own lines. around biaå‚ystok and minsk,the many thousands who did not make it outfaced death or captivity. they fought on,launching desperate counterattacks in a bid to escape the encirclement. they inflicted heavycasualties on the enemy. but finally, two weeks after the invasion,resistance in the pocket came to an end.

290,000 soviet soldiers entered captivity,a fate from which few would return. general pavlov,commander of the western front, his chief of staff majorgeneral klimovskikh, and commander of the 4th army generalkorobkov, and several other officers, were all arrested on charges of cowardiceand criminal incompetence. under nkvd interrogationpavlov denied his guilt, citing the enormous difficulties he hadfaced. but stalin needed scapegoats. the trial’s outcome was never in doubt.they were all sentenced to death. pavlov was shot on that same dayby the secret police.

to the south in ukraine,the red army’s south-western front managed to evade mass encirclementsin the first week of the war. the germans advanced between150 and 170 kilometres, before the disaster at minsk forced the redarmy to pull back to the dnieper river. german high command was in high spiritsfollowing these early victories. surely, it was thought, the russianscan’t survive the loss of so many men, tanks and aircraft. soviet collapsehad to be just around the corner. franz halder, head of thegerman general staff, wrote, “it would be no exaggeration to saythat the war against russia

has been won in the first 14 days.” the germans’ next objective was smolensk…but this would not be so straightforward. for a start, german forceshad been concentrated for the early battles on the frontier. now their forces were spread outfrom the baltic to southern ukraine. secondly, soviet reserve armieshad begun to reach the battlefield. they played no part in the early fighting, but now stood ready on the banksof the dnieper and the dvina. guderian and hoth’s panzer groupsstarted rolling east once more.

their mission was to advance far ahead of the main force and join up east of smolensk. but soon guderian’s2nd panzer group came under attack from fresh soviet armies arriving from the east. after ferocious fighting, guderian was forced onto the defensive. soon hoth also had to switch to defence. a soviet counterattack forced his mento give up velikiye luki. it was the first russian cityto be recaptured from the germans. the speed of their advancehad left the german panzer groups isolated. not until the main force of the germanarmy caught up could their advance resume.

army group north had also run into trouble. the assault on novgorodhad ground to a halt. moreover, the german 8th panzer divisionbecame encircled near the city of soltsy, and had to fight its way out. a german officer recorded in his diary, “we have no sensation of enteringa defeated country, as we had in france. instead we have resistance, permanentresistance, no matter how hopeless it is.” by august the red army had somehowmanaged to stabilise the situation. a front line was re-established,

allowing thousands of stragglersto catch up with the retreating army. after struggling through forestsand marshes for a month, the remnants of kuznetsov’s armyfinally reached their own lines. there were many such stragglerstrekking east in the summer of 1941, in groups of a dozen,to a thousand or more. meanwhile guderian was preparinga fresh assault on moscow. on 21st august his units were at theirstart positions near the city of starodub. but the same day hitler issued a directivethat shocked his army group commanders. general halder would describe it as thedecisive moment of the entire campaign.

army group centre was refusedpermission to advance on moscow. instead, hoth was ordered northto reinforce the assault on leningrad. guderian was ordered south to assist theencirclement of soviet troops in ukraine. guderian immediately flew to berlinto demand an audience with hitler. in person, he forcefully made his case thatnow was the moment to strike at moscow. in his memoirs guderian wrote: “i pointed out the serious consequencesthat would surely arise if operations in the south dragged ontoo long. if that happened, then it would be too lateto assault moscow that year.”

hitler and the army high commandremained adamant. summer was already drawing to a closeas guderian’s panzer group struck south, against the flank of the sovietsouth-western front. if he could reach the german-heldbridgeheads across the dnieper river, the red army forces defending kievwould all be trapped. after his escapefrom the minsk encirclement, general kuznetsov had been putin command of the 21st army. his troops were right in the pathof guderian’s 2nd panzer group. the soviet high commandhad to make a choice:

to fight it out along the dnieper river,and risk further massive encirclements if the line was breached —or retreat further east to buy their troops some breathing space. in the end, it was decidedthe dnieper was too strong a position to abandon without a fight. a close watch was kept onthe german panzer divisions. but in august,they seemed bound for moscow. the main threat to the south-westernand southern fronts seemed to be fromvon kleist’s 1st panzer group,

far to the south on the lowerreaches of the dnieper. by august 1941, the red armywas chronically short of tanks. its mechanized units had been annihilatedin the opening battles of the campaign. kuznetsov’s 21st army, for example,had just 16 tanks remaining. kuznetsov’s weakened 21st armywas brushed aside by guderian’s troops, as they smashed their way towardslokhvitsa — 125 miles east of kiev. guderian was about to cut off all the soviettroops defending the ukrainian capital. it seemed high time to order the troops of the soviet south-western front into retreat. but the soviet high command hesitated,

waiting for the latest informationfrom the front. the germans meanwhile strengthenedtheir bridgehead over the dnieper river near the city of kremenchuk. there they built an enormousfloating bridge half a mile long. von kleist’s 1st panzer groupraced to kremenchuk at full speed. the tanks crossed the dnieperunder the cover of darkness and rain, and joined upwith guderian’s forces at lokhvitsa. the soviet high commandhad hesitated too long. all troops of the south-western frontin the kiev area were now trapped.

for the red army the unfolding disasterat kiev set a bleak record – it was the largest encirclementin the history of warfare. an estimated 532,000 troopswere encircled at kiev. only 15 to 20,000 would escape. the fighting in the kiev pocket dragged onuntil the end of september. the red army’s chronicshortage of tanks was revealed by how many were capturedat kiev — just 50. meanwhile german army group centre, having been strippedof guderian and hoth’s tanks,

fought off large-scale sovietcounter-attacks near smolensk. in these desperate battlesthe red army guards units were born. for the bravery shown amidstheavy fighting around yelnia, the 100th rifle division was awardedthe title of 1st guards rifle division. general hoth later wrote:“we sustained heavy casualties, especially amongst the junior officers. the losses were higherthan during previous attacks, and were only partially recoveredthrough replacements.” according to the germangeneral staff’s timetable,

the soviet union was supposed to collapsein just one more month of fighting. but to exhausted german unitson the frontline, their final objectives seemed moreand more remote. the red army was also desperate. with theencirclement of so many troops at kiev, the soviet high command was forced to throwevery available unit into the front line. and now, with the finalcrushing of the kiev pocket, guderian, hoepner and hoth’s panzer groupsonce more turned towards moscow. of these panzer generals, guderian would be removed from command in just a few months. hoepner would be dismissed by hitler“for cowardice and disobeying orders”.

only papa hoth would keep his job. meanwhile offensives near moscow…battles around stalingrad… and a return to byelorussia,all lay in store for general kuznetsov. in 1945, his men would lead the attackon berlin,and on the reichstag itself. and on 1st may 1945, soldiers of the150th division of general kuznetsov’s 3rd assault army — aleksey berest,mikhail yegorov and meliton kantaria — would hoist the hammerand sickle over the reichstag. but for now, the war wasjust three months old. and in a few days,the battle for moscow would begin.